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Summary: The multiplication of international courts and tribunals in 
recent decades has paved the way for a judicialisation of internation-
al law and has therefore profoundly changed the landscape of inter-
national law. Whereas the existence of a panoply of dispute resolution 
avenues is a welcome development which may be conceptualised as 
part of an ongoing constitutionalisation of international law, it has 
concomitantly activated the problem of confl ict between different ju-
dicial actors. Although doubtlessly designed as an international court 
sui generis, the ECJ forms part of this international dispute settlement 
architecture and has to compete with other international actors in the 
case of jurisdictional overlaps. The recent MOX plant saga is an illus-
tration of these competing forces at play and underscores the self-per-
ception of the ECJ as a constitutional court reluctant to pay deference 
to the pronouncements of other international judicial actors. Although 
fi tting squarely with the Court’s mandate issued by the framers of 
the EC Treaty in Article 292, this approach risks an undesirable frag-
mentation of international law as a whole, which could be avoided by 
reference to a number of confl ict avoidance devices available to inter-
national courts and tribunals.
I. Introduction
It is diffi cult not to restate the obvious when one speaks of a mul-
tiplication of international courts and tribunals which has transformed 
the international legal order in recent decades.1 Yet, the importance of 
this phenomenon in terms of gradually paving the way for an interna-
tional community adhering to the idea of the rule of law can hardly be 
overstated. Within the European polity one may refer to the examples 
of the ECJ, the ECHR, but also the EFTA Court, all associated with re-
gional (economic) integration organisations. However, the proliferation of 
international courts has gone beyond the confi nes of regional integration 
*  Bernhard Hofstötter, University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
1  Cesare P.R. Romano, ‘The Proliferation of International Tribunals: The Pieces of the Puz-
zle’ (1999) NYU JIL and Politics 709.
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organisations, as illustrated by the ICTY and the ICTR,2 the ICC3 and IT-
LOS,4 but also by an even more recent trend to establish so-called hybrid 
criminal tribunals which seek to marry the best (and actually sometimes 
the worst) of national and international law.5 Still, the more senior ICJ 
with its (potentially) all-encompassing jurisdiction over international law 
disputes enjoys pride of place as the ‘principal judicial organ of the Unit-
ed Nations’ (Article 92 UN Charter). 
The more a legal system matures, the more it will provide for a devel-
oped hierarchy of norms, with ultimate system values fi nding expression 
in norms of superior rank, such as jus cogens, as well as a panoply of 
different avenues of dispute settlement. Both developments may be per-
ceived as fostering the constitutionalisation of international law.6 At the 
same time, these largely compartmentalised developments7 may come at 
the price of a lack of systemic coherence, fragmentation, more frequent 
claims to self-containedness of sub-regimes and the constant striving of 
hierarchically equal international actors, including international courts 
and tribunals, to ensure their relevance and leave their imprints on the 
international plane. There are currently no mechanisms in play to miti-
gate these forces by means of hierarchy. 
Whereas the very existence of different alternatives for dispute set-
tlement is hardly a concern from the viewpoint of fragmentation, over-
lapping jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals ‘activate’ the 
problem by potentially giving rise to confl icting decisions which may put 
States into the awkward position of having to pick and choose which rul-
ing to follow, or by providing a way for forum shopping. The case of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) may be special insofar as it is designed 
as the ultimate arbiter within the Community legal order (Article 220 EC) 
2  These international criminal tribunals were set up by UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN 
Doc S/RES/827 and UNSC Res 995 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/995 respectively.
3  The ICC was established by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
2187 UNTS 90, which entered into force on 1 July 2002.
4  The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 UNTS 3, foresees in Part 
XV a comprehensive system for the settlement of disputes of which the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) forms part, its aim being to adjudicate disputes arising 
out of the interpretation and application of the Convention. Inaugurated in 1996 and with 
a mere 13 cases referred to it since then, ITLOS has remained a fairly invisible actor on the 
international stage. 
5  James Cockayne, ‘The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals’ 
(2005) 28 Fordham ILJ 616, 619.
6  For a recent account, see Erika de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 
55 ICLQ 51.
7  See Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Con-
fl icting Jurisdiction - Problems and Possible Solutions’ (2001) Max Planck YB of UN Law 
67, 72.
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with, in general, compulsory jurisdiction over the EU Member States.8 
This judicial monopoly on the interpretation of Community law is further 
hedged by Article 292 EC according to which Member States are obliged 
not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
the EC Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for 
in the Treaty. However, in the face of a multitude of international agree-
ments concluded by the EC alone, or in conjunction with the EU Member 
States, the ECJ is increasingly confronted with the application and inter-
pretation of treaties which may in turn provide for their own methods of 
dispute resolution. 
Against this background, the recent case law related to Article 292 
EC, and the imminent danger of further instances of judicial confl icts, it 
is worth exploring the precise limits of the ECJ’s judicial monopoly. How 
far do EU Member States retain competence to submit disputes relating 
to international law to arbitral tribunals? Once an international tribunal 
has been seized of a dispute, how may the ensuing problem of system 
confl ict between the Community legal order as a purported ‘new legal 
order of international law’ and general international law be settled? In 
other words, what is the relationship between the micro-perspective of 
Community law and the macro-perspective of international law in terms 
of inter-state dispute settlement? After examining these issues, we will 
conclude by suggesting techniques to avoid confl ict among international 
courts. 
II. Article 292 EC in an age of multiple dispute settlement fora
Article 292 EC has literally remained a dead letter in contentious pro-
ceedings before the ECJ until it reached the central stage in the Court’s 
recent judgment in Commission v Ireland9. Article 292 EC reads:
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settle-
ment other than those provided for therein.10
Put positively, this rather straightforward and unambiguous provi-
sion allows Member States to submit disputes to international courts and 
tribunals other than the ECJ only where they relate to rights and obliga-
tions which do not fl ow from the EC Treaty. Beyond this obligation not 
to pursue alternative avenues of dispute settlement, Article 239 EC gives 
8  But see also Article 35 EU which provides for an optional clause along similar lines to 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute in the realm of the third pillar.
9  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635.
10  Note that Article 193 EURATOM Treaty contains a similarly worded provision. 
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the ECJ an optional jurisdiction in any dispute ‘which relates to the sub-
ject matter of this Treaty’, if the Member States have chosen ad hoc to re-
fer such a dispute to the ECJ. The answer to the question to what extent 
Member States must refrain from involving other international courts 
and tribunals consequently oscillates between disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of the EC Treaty and disputes relating to the 
subject matter of the EC Treaty. Only in the former case are they barred 
from referring a case to alternative dispute settlement fora, whereas in 
the latter instance they fully retain their power under international law 
to settle their disputes peacefully by means of their choice (Article 33 UN 
Charter).
Article 292 EC had only once surfaced in the Court’s case law be-
fore Commission v Ireland, namely in Opinion 1/91 with regard to the 
establishment of an EEA court competent to authoritatively interpret the 
EEA agreement for all the contracting parties to this agreement. There 
the Court ruled out the possibility of establishing a separate EEA Court, 
explaining that conferring jurisdiction on such a court
… is likely adversely to affect the allocation of responsibilities de-
fi ned in the Treaties, and, hence, the autonomy of the Community 
legal order, respect of which must be assured by the Court of Jus-
tice pursuant to Article 164 EEC Treaty [now Article 220 EC]. This 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court is confi rmed by Article 219 EEC 
Treaty [now Article 292 EC], under which member states undertake 
not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of that treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided 
for in the Treaty.11 
The rationale of Article 292 EC is therefore linked with the autonomy 
of Community law which fi nds expression in its uniform interpretation 
and application, secured in the last instance by the judicial monopoly of 
the ECJ.12 As Barents explains, ‘Articles 220 and 292 EC both refer to 
the “interpretation and application” of the EC Treaty, as a result of which 
the Community courts are exclusively competent to “make” the law of the 
Community, thus confi rming the principle, occasionally denied or criti-
cised, “Curia locuta, causa fi nita”’.13 
Needless to say, Article 292 EC extends to Community law in toto, 
and thus includes both primary and secondary Community law as well 
11  Opinion 1/91 [1991] I-6079 para 35.
12  Cf Marco Bronckers, ‘The Relationship of the EC Courts with Other International Tribu-
nals: Non-committal, Respectful or Submissive?’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 601, 606.
13  René Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (European Monograph Series, Kluwer, 
The Hague 2004) 288.
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as treaties concluded by the Community, and mixed agreements, since 
they form an integral part of the Community legal order, as far as they do 
not relate to an exclusive Member State competence. If one is mindful of a 
transformation of international law which has been brought about by the 
multiplication of international organisations predominantly inhabited by 
lawyers - international courts and tribunals - in particular after the end 
of the Cold War, it must come as less than a surprise that the actual rel-
evance of Article 292 EC is increasing. A number of dispute settlement 
mechanisms contained in mixed agreements have been ratifi ed by the EC 
and the EU Member States. Examples of note include the UNCLOS or the 
OSPAR Conventions. Both provide for dispute settlement systems which 
do not explicitly foresee a role for the ECJ.
III. Article 292 EC in the MOX Plant dispute 
A. History of proceedings
The MOX plant dispute has involved two arbitral tribunals estab-
lished under the OSPAR and UNCLOS conventions respectively, ITLOS as 
well as the ECJ. Its factual background is centred on the authorisation 
and operation of the MOX plant in Sellafi eld, Cumbria, a plant designed 
to convert plutonium from spent nuclear fuel into a fuel called MOX14 
which is used as an energy source in nuclear power stations. The two 
arbitrations initiated by Ireland related to two distinct claims: 
First, before an arbitral tribunal established under the OSPAR Con-
vention, Ireland demanded the disclosure of all relevant information re-
lating to radioactive discharges of the MOX plant pursuant to Article 9 of 
the OSPAR Convention, which requires states parties to make available 
information on the state of the maritime area and on activities or meas-
ures adversely affecting or likely to affect it (Article 9(1) and (2) OSPAR). 
Second, Ireland alleged a violation by the United Kingdom of the 
environmental obligations incumbent on states parties to UNCLOS. More 
specifi cally, Ireland argued inter alia that the United Kingdom had failed 
to take the necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment of the Irish Sea by discharges of radioactive 
materials and wastes originating from the MOX plant. An arbitral tribu-
nal established under Article 287 UNCLOS15 should adjudicate this latter 
set of claims. 
14  An acronym for ‘mixed oxide fuel’.
15  It is to be noted that Article 287 UNCLOS, whilst providing for compulsory dispute set-
tlement, leaves the choice of means to the discretion of the parties. Thus, states may chose 
one or more of the following dispute settlement bodies: ITLOS, the ICJ and/or arbitral tribu-
nals. Since in this case there was no common agreement on a more institutionalised form of 
dispute settlement between the parties, only arbitration could be resorted to. 
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B. The OSPAR award
In its fi nal award of 2 July 2003,16 the arbitral tribunal dismissed the 
claims presented by Ireland, relying on a narrow interpretation of Article 
9 of the OSPAR Convention. Although the tribunal was aware that the 
question of access to documents had connotations with European Com-
munity law, and in particular with Directive 90/313/EEC,17 it considered 
itself only competent to decide on the basis of the Convention. The tribu-
nal reasoned that ‘[e]ach of the OSPAR Convention and Directive 90/313 
is an independent legal source that establishes a distinct legal regime 
and provides for different legal remedies’.18 In light of the more malleable 
wording of Article 32(5)(a) OSPAR which defi nes the law to be applied 
by arbitral tribunals and refers to the ‘rules of international law and, in 
particular, those of the Convention’, such a restrictive construction must 
come as a surprise.19 Equally, with regard to available dispute settle-
ment avenues the arbitral tribunal sees the purportedly self-contained 
dispute resolution mechanism envisaged in Article 32 OSPAR Conven-
tion in complete isolation from the remedies available in the Community 
legal order.20 The tribunal is therefore somewhat mindful of the problems 
surrounding Article 292 EC, but does not explicitly refer to this provision 
and errs in viewing the ECJ’s potential role in terms of party choice only, 
therefore failing to appraise the constraining forces of Article 292 EC for 
the Member States. 
Even though at one point the tribunal claims to derive further sup-
port for its interpretation of Article 9 OSPAR Convention from the relevant 
rules of international law and European Union law,21 it does not actually 
take into account rights and obligations fl owing from Community law in 
its award. The paradoxical result of its approach is that the dispute be-
tween two EU Member States is decided on the basis of international law 
only, leaving aside applicable secondary Community law which has been 
interpreted far more extensively by the ECJ.
16  OSPAR Arbitration (Ireland v UK) (2003), available online at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1158> accessed 11 June 2007.
17  Council Directive (EEC) 90/313 on the freedom of access to information on the environ-
ment [1990] OJ L158/56, as subsequently replaced by Directive 2003/4 (EC) of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental information and 
repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L41/26.
18  OSPAR Arbitration (Ireland v UK) (2003) para 142.
19  See also Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘MOX Plant Dispute, Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities’ [2006] EuConst 456, 460.
20  OSPAR Arbitration (Ireland v UK) (2003) para 143.
21  OSPAR Arbitration (Ireland v UK) (2003) para 139.
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C. The UNCLOS proceedings
Before an arbitral tribunal had been established, Ireland had re-
quested ITLOS inter alia to prescribe that the United Kingdom immedi-
ately suspend the authorisation of the MOX plant and ensure that no 
trans-border movements of radioactive substances or wastes take place. 
Pursuant to Article 290(5) UNCLOS, ITLOS may, pending the constitu-
tion of an arbitral tribunal, prescribe provisional measures in cases of 
urgency, if it considers that the arbitral tribunal to be constituted would 
have jurisdiction. By order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS affi rmed prima 
facie jurisdiction and ordered both parties to cooperate and enter into 
consultations with regard to the potential environmental effects of the 
MOX plant on the Irish Sea.22 In so fi nding, ITLOS had not taken stock 
of the argument advanced by the United Kingdom, whereas Article 292 
of the EC Treaty ruled out the jurisdiction of a tribunal set up under 
Annex VII of UNCLOS.23 In a separate opinion Judge Wolfrum squarely 
addressed the issue of Article 292 EC and reasoned in blissful ignorance 
of the concept of mixed agreements that the Community law framework 
would not suggest that the ECJ was competent to decide on disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS.24 Once the 
arbitral tribunal had been constituted in February 2002, it equally ac-
cepted its prima facie jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case.25 At the 
same time, however, it pointed to the necessity of arriving at a defi nitive 
conclusion whether or not it was endowed with jurisdiction,26 not least 
mandated by the objection on jurisdiction raised by the United Kingdom. 
The tribunal proved receptive of the UK’s line of argument and recognised 
that the dispute related to matters essentially of concern to a separate 
legal order, namely the Community legal order, and had to be determined 
within the institutional framework of the latter.27 In spite of the risk of 
considerable delay, the tribunal could not fi rmly establish its jurisdiction 
with regard to all the claims presented until the Community law issues 
22  MOX Plant Case (No 10) (Ireland v UK) (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001) 
available online at <http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html> accessed 11 June 2007.
23  MOX Plant Case (No 10) (Ireland v UK) written response of the UK, paras 166ff.
24  MOX Plant Case (No 10) (Ireland v UK) separate opinion of Judge Wolfrum, under heading 
‘Article 282 of the Convention’.
25  MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Order No 3 of 24 June 2003), para 14; available online at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/show-
page.asp?pag_id=1148> accessed 11 June 2007. 
26  MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Order No 3 of 24 June 2003) para 15. 
27  MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Order No 3 of 24 June 2003) para 24. 
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had been defi nitively resolved by the ECJ.28 Consequently, it decided to 
suspend the proceedings, implicitly inviting the parties to settle the out-
standing issues before the ECJ. In further motivating its decision the 
tribunal explained:
In the circumstances, and bearing in mind considerations of mutual 
respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institu-
tions both of which may be called upon to determine rights and ob-
ligations as between two States, the Tribunal considers that it would 
be inappropriate for it to proceed further with hearing the Parties 
on the merits of the dispute in the absence of a resolution of the 
problems referred to. Moreover, a procedure that might result in two 
confl icting decisions on the same issue would not be helpful to the 
resolution of the dispute between the Parties.29
D. The judgment of the ECJ 
Even before the beginning of the oral pleadings before the UNCLOS 
arbitral tribunal, it had become known that the European Commission 
was contemplating instituting infringement proceedings under Article 
226 EC. This had raised the tribunal’s fear of two possibly confl icting 
decisions which would be unhelpful to the parties seeking resolution of 
their dispute,30 and obviously contributed to its decision to stay proceed-
ings. The imminent danger of the Commission starting proceedings fi nally 
materialised at around the time when the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal ren-
dered Order No. 3.31 The Commission based its argument on the following 
heads of complaint: by bringing proceedings under UNCLOS, Ireland had 
failed to respect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court as enshrined in 
Article 292 EC as well as the corresponding provision in the EURATOM 
Treaty. Moreover, it had violated its duty of cooperation under Article 10 
EC as it had failed to inform and consult with the Commission.
The Court started by pointing out that, from the viewpoint of the 
Community legal order, UNCLOS is a mixed agreement which shares the 
same legal characteristics as agreements concluded by the Community 
alone. Thus, according to settled case law its provisions form an integral 
28  MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Order No 3 of 24 June 2003) para 25. 
29  MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Order No 3 of 24 June 2003) para 28. 
30  MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Order No 3 of 24 June 2003) paras 21 and 28. 
31  Robin Churchill and Joanne Scott, ‘The MOX Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life’ (2004) 
53 ICLQ 643, 656. 
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part of the Community legal order.32 As Article 292 EC only establishes a 
judicial monopoly of the ECJ with regard to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Treaty, the Court went on to examine whether the provisions 
of UNCLOS at issue - essentially those relating to marine environmental 
pollution - relate to a competence exercised by the Community. Refer-
ring to a number of directives adopted in the fi eld, it concluded that ‘the 
matters covered by the provisions of the Convention relied on by Ireland 
before the Arbitral Tribunal are very largely regulated by Community 
measures’.33 Consequently, in applying its long-standing ERTA jurispru-
dence,34 the Court held that the provisions of UNCLOS invoked by Ireland 
before the arbitral tribunal come within the scope of Community compe-
tence and form part of the Community legal order, in turn triggering the 
Court’s jurisdiction.35 
Next, the Court turned to the question whether its jurisdiction could 
be considered exclusive in light of the dispute settlement system provided 
for by UNCLOS. Here, the Court reiterated its approach expounded in 
Opinion 1/91 according to which international agreements cannot affect 
the allocation of responsibilities defi ned in the Treaties and thus the au-
tonomy of the Community legal system. The Court found confi rmation of 
the exclusivity of its jurisdiction in Article 292 EC.36 Whereas one could 
therefore expect that the Community system of judicial protection, more 
precisely Article 227 EC, would simply override the dispute settlement 
provisions in UNCLOS, the Court found a stepping stone for a more har-
monious interpretation in Article 282 UNCLOS, which contains a confl ict 
of jurisdictions clause. If the parties to a dispute ‘have agreed, through 
a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise’ to a particular 
procedure entailing a binding decision, this procedure shall take prec-
edence over the normal procedure provided for in UNCLOS. Thus, the 
Court found that UNCLOS itself is amenable to an interpretation avoiding 
a breach of the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.37 
In sum, the Court found Ireland precluded from initiating proceed-
ings before the arbitral tribunal in light of its own exclusive jurisdiction.38 
As the Court explains, just the manifest risk that the jurisdictional order 
laid down in the Treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of the Com-
munity legal system, may be adversely affected is suffi cient for fi nding a 
32  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 paras 82-84.
33  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 110.
34  Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263. 
35  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 paras 120-121.
36  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 123.
37  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 124.
38  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 133.
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breach of Article 292 EC,39 regardless of whether or not an arbitral tribu-
nal has been called upon to actually pronounce on a rule of Community 
law. In a most important obiter dictum the Court explains: ‘It is for the 
Court, should the need arise, to identify the elements of the dispute which 
relate to provisions of the international agreement in question which fall 
outside its jurisdiction.’40 In other words, the Court clearly reserves for 
itself a compétence de la compétence of sorts to determine the outer limits 
of its exclusive jurisdiction, and in this way hedges its pre-eminence over 
international arbitral tribunals. 
With regard to the alleged breach of the duty of consultation and 
information with the Community institutions pursuant to Article 10 EC, 
the Court notes an obligation of Member States for consultation prior to 
instituting dispute settlement proceedings, which Ireland failed to ob-
serve.41 
IV. The death of inter-state arbitration in the EU, but did the ECJ 
get it right?
A. An extensive interpretation of Article 292 EC
In its insistence on a broad scope of application for Article 292 EC, 
the judgment in Commission v Ireland must have come as less than a 
surprise to a student of the Court’s case law. Still, the paucity of authori-
ties on the exact implications of Article 292 EC could leave some room 
for doubt, which the Court by now has fi lled with well-rehearsed argu-
ments based on the need to preserve the autonomy of Community law. 
The ECJ has opted for a sweeping interpretation of Article 292 EC, thus 
emphasising the effet utile of Article 292 EC which hedges the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court. This is apparent from at least three aspects of 
the Court’s judgment:
First, with regard to its competence to interpret provisions of mixed 
agreements, the Court has proved consistently unwilling to enter into dis-
cussions about the exact attribution of a particular treaty provision to the 
two spheres of competences. In fact it is one of the virtues of mixed agree-
ments to help avoid complicated delineation of power exercises.42 Instead, 
the Court has opted to take on broad interpretative powers whenever a 
mixed agreement concerns a fi eld largely covered by Community law.43 In 
39  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 154-156.
40  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 135.
41  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 paras 172-182.
42  Piet Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union - Legal and Constitutional Foun-
dations (Oxford EC Law Library, OUP, Oxford 2004) 236.
43  Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (2nd edn 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005) 6-014. 
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Commission v Ireland, however, the Court for the fi rst time explicitly as-
sumes that it alone is competent to decide in case of doubt if a part of an 
agreement falls within Community competence.44 Thus, it would appear 
that Member States are precluded from letting arbitral tribunals examine 
this question fi rst. Therefore, Member States which eschew the risk of 
subsequent Commission-initiated infringement proceedings will have to 
bring inter-state infringement actions before the ECJ whenever an issue 
appears to be covered by Community law. This way, the ongoing prolif-
eration of mixed agreements in the Community legal order will allow the 
Court a fi rm say in their interpretation and application.
Second, this fi nding is corroborated by the accentuated duty of con-
sultation and information with the Community institutions prior to in-
stituting proceedings before an arbitral tribunal. It is probably not an 
oversight that the Court in paragraph 179 refers to the Community in-
stitutions wholesale, and not just to the Commission, as the Member 
States’ interlocutors with regard to their obligation as per Article 10 EC. 
Since the notion of Community institution is inclusive of the Court (cf Ar-
ticle 7 EC), this means that the duties fl owing from Article 10 EC include 
consultation with the ECJ in the framework of (contentious) proceedings, 
before an arbitral tribunal may be established.45 In this sense, Article 10 
EC feeds back into the Court’s expansive interpretation of Article 292 EC 
and yet again vigorously asserts the Court’s relevance in the interpreta-
tion of international agreements. 
Third, the Court is satisfi ed with a ‘manifest risk’ of a referral to 
an arbitral tribunal impinging on the autonomy of the Community legal 
system. By focusing on a potential instead of an actual trespass into the 
Community judicial system, again the freedom of Member States to sub-
mit disputes to arbitral tribunals is signifi cantly curtailed. 
As is apparent from these considerations, one cannot but under-
stand the judgment in Commission v Ireland as essentially preserving 
the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. By the same token, however, one may 
wonder why the Court opts for linking Article 292 EC with Community 
competences at all. After all, Article 292 EC does not appear to necessar-
ily require such a link, as it merely refers to the ‘interpretation or applica-
tion’ of the Treaty. Whether a given question concerns the interpretation 
or application of the Treaty is not primarily an issue of competence, al-
though competence may give guidance whether or not the Treaty applies. 
We see a similar approach, albeit not consistently, in the Court’s case 
44  Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘MOX Plant Dispute, Court of Justice of the European Communities’ 
[2006] EuConst 456, 465.
45  Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘MOX Plant Dispute, Court of Justice of the European Communities’ 
[2006] EuConst 456, 465.
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law on Union citizenship, where the Court at times examines pertinent 
Community competences in order to decide whether or not the prohibi-
tion of discrimination based on Article 12 EC is applicable46 as the latter 
presupposes the applicability of EC law.47 It is thus conceivable that the 
ECJ would have sidestepped the competence issue, reasoning instead - 
as it would normally do in connection with mixed agreements - that it has 
competence to interpret mixed agreements regardless of whether their 
provisions relate to the Community or Member States sphere of compe-
tence.48 This jurisdiction would then eo ipso be elevated to an exclusive 
jurisdiction by means of Article 292. It is therefore arguable that in spite 
of advocating an expansive interpretation of Article 292 EC, the Court 
has not opted for a maximum solution in Commission v Ireland, walking 
along the rather stable competence path instead of interpreting Article 
292 EC as free from competence implications. The judgment is, of course, 
unrevealing as to why the Court proceeded as it did, but elements of judi-
cial comity vis-à-vis international judicial actors may have played a role. 
 Needless to say, the Court’s expansive construction of Article 292 
EC has immediate repercussions on the conformity with EC law of inter-
state arbitration between EU Member States which must be considered 
as practically defunct after Commission v Ireland. This begs the question 
if the solution expounded by the Court is viable, given that in an inter-
nationalist perspective the ECJ is just a regional actor and thus but a 
fraction of the international system of dispute settlement. 
B. Hic sunt leones - International Courts and Tribunals as a threat to 
the autonomy of Community law?
Since the inception of its judicial activity, the ECJ has underscored 
the sui generis nature of the Community legal order. By pointing out 
46  See, for instance, Case C-209/03 Dany Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119 paras 39-43.
47  Article 12 EC reads: ‘Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice 
to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
shall be prohibited’ (emphasis added).
48  The link with Community competence is already missing in the Court’s early case law 
on its jurisdiction to interpret mixed agreements, such as in Demirel, where the Court in 
interpreting a provision of the association agreement with Turkey held that the question 
whether it was competent to rule on a provision falling under Member State competence 
did not arise (Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719 paras 6-12). In the later Hèrmes (Case 
C-53/96 Hèrmes [1998] ECR I-3603) and Christian Dior (Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-
392/98 Christian Dior [2000] ECR I-11307) cases, again the competence issue was not ap-
plied as a criterion for the Court’s jurisdiction. At the same time, one may argue that the 
relevance of the allocation of competences between the Community and the Member States 
for the extent of the Court’s jurisdiction is simply ‘left in the dark’, without defi nitively deny-
ing its relevance. See Piet Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union - Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations (Oxford EC Law Library, OUP, Oxford 2004) 271. I am grateful 
to Professor Marise Cremona for this point. 
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that Community law forms a ‘new legal order of international law’,49 the 
Court has managed to secure the relevance of the former in the national 
legal orders and thereby tamed the disruptive forces of national laws to 
the postulated autonomy of the ‘new law’. In this sense, the argument 
of a new legal order lays the discursive foundation for the transforma-
tory doctrines of supremacy and direct effect.50 Again underscoring the 
sui generis nature of Community law, the Court later identifi ed the EC 
Treaty as the constitutional charter of the Community.51 Whereas insist-
ence on the autonomy of the Community legal order was crucial in order 
to position Community law vis-à-vis national law as more than a ‘diplo-
matic law’ of sorts which would be suffi ciently malleable not to stand in 
the way of later ‘derogations’ by national law,52 international law seemed 
less of a threat to the Community legal order. Unprecedented in its scope 
of rights granted to individuals, there was hardly any room for confl ict 
with international law, save perhaps with fundamental rights, a debate to 
burgeon only later. Indeed, the reference to international law in van Gend 
& Loos had little to do with positioning Community law within the global 
framework of international law.53 Rather, it was about teaching national 
courts a lesson on how Community law was to be applied by referring to 
terms familiar to them: regardless of the perennial controversies between 
monists and dualists, Community law was to be invoked before national 
courts, and in addition was to take the supreme position in the national 
hierarchies of norms, even to the detriment of national constitutional 
law.54 
In Commission v Ireland, the Court arguably catches up on position-
ing Community law vis-à-vis international law, which seemed of no avail 
in the early causes célèbres. It is not by coincidence that a case of classic 
49  Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1 para 12.
50  Instead of many, see J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, in J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe - ‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ and other Essays on Euro-
pean Integration (CUP, Cambridge 1999) 10, 16 [reprint of 100 YLJ (1991) 2403].
51  Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 para 23.
52  This was the issue in Case 6/64 Costa/ENEL [1964] 585.
53  At any rate, in light of the ‘individualizing potential’ of international law as elaborated 
by the PCIJ in its advisory opinion on the jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Jurisdiction 
of the Courts of Danzig (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Rep Series B No 15), the juxtaposition of 
international law and Community law in van Gend & Loos was predicated on a not fully 
accurate depiction of international law: whereas the scope and breadth of the involvement 
of the individual was unprecedented in Community law, the idea of an international agree-
ment granting rights to individuals which they could then invoke before national courts was 
by no means new in the 1960s and could thus not be the hallmark of the ‘new legal order 
of international law’. For this point, see Bernhard Hofstötter, Non-Compliance of National 
Courts - Remedies in European Community Law and Beyond (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 
2005) 14.
54  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 para 24.
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inter-state arbitration between two EU Member States - an area where 
overlaps with the Community legal order are potentially great - gave rise 
to the Court’s attempt at delimitation. In short, the Court extends the 
autonomy argument to the relationship with international law.55 At fi rst 
sight, this may be rather unsurprising as we could interpret the early 
judgments also in the sense that although they contain reactions to na-
tional law, they still proclaim the autonomy of Community law in an 
all-embracing fashion. But then such a reading had to seem unlikely, 
given that quite different stakes are involved in defi ning the relation-
ship between Community law and national law on the one hand, and 
between Community law and international law, on the other. The issue of 
international inter-court relationships surfacing in Commission v Ireland 
illustrates this well. Few would doubt that a host of rulings by national 
courts of last instance disrespectful of the role attributed to the ECJ by 
Article 234(3) EC as well as substantively non-compliant with Commu-
nity law, as interpreted by the ECJ, would be disruptive of the coherence 
and, thus, the autonomy of Community law. On the other hand, isolated 
instances of judicial non-compliance56 in the case law of national consti-
tutional courts, in particular, could hardly upset the coherence and over-
all effectiveness of the Community legal order. Against this background, 
it is far from clear that isolated awards rendered by arbitral tribunals 
would have to be perceived as a systemic threat to coherence. But if the 
autonomy of the Community legal order is not actually at stake, a more 
liberal reading of Article 292 EC would not be ruled out. The terra incog-
nita of international arbitration possibly inhabited by lions (leones) liable 
to put in jeopardy the autonomy of the Community legal order alongside 
the Court’s judicial monopoly of interpretation may thus not be in need 
of being policed in the manner put forward by the Court. 
It is apparent that the ECJ follows the logics of an internal perspec-
tive and consequently opts for a far-reaching hedging of its prerogatives. 
By contrast, the external perspective brought into the picture by the in-
volvement of arbitral tribunals set up under international agreements 
only marginally affects the Court’s reasoning. In its emphasis on a per-
spective intrinsic to the Community legal order, the Court underlines 
its role as a constitutional court whose task is the preservation of the 
autonomy of the Community legal order. There is no room left for any 
other international courts or tribunals, once a link with Community law 
- however tenuous - has been established. In its focus on an internal per-
spective, the Court’s self-perception is akin to that of national constitu-
55  Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘MOX Plant Dispute, Court of Justice of the European Communities’ 
[2006] EuConst 456, 464.
56  Such as for instance the (by now historical) denial of direct effect by the French Conseil 
d’Etat in Cohn-Bendit (1979) RTDE 175.
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tional courts vis-à-vis the ECJ itself, which still prove relatively reluctant 
to refer questions for preliminary rulings to the Court, in spite of their 
duty to do so under Article 234(3) EC.57 The same goes for the by now 
historical controversies between the ECJ and the German Constitutional 
Court with regard to the contested supremacy of Community law in light 
of the absence of a written catalogue of fundamental rights. 
With this in mind, the judgment in Commission v Ireland may be 
counted among the grand constitutional rulings rendered by the ECJ. 
From an international law perspective, the balance sheet appears more 
ambiguous, however. The ECJ is not only a constitutional court but rath-
er hybrid in nature, combining features of domestic and international 
courts.58 With regard to its function as a court of international law, the 
Court arguably ignores the external perspective and consequently the 
fact that from the international law perspective it is but one among a 
steadily growing number of judicial actors. In relying exclusively on the 
logics inherent in Community law, it purports as self-evident something 
which is far from self-evident, namely, it implies a judicial hierarchy in 
international law with itself on top. Such a hierarchy is unknown to inter-
national law, however. As can be gleaned from Commission v Ireland, the 
ECJ’s answer to confl icting jurisdictions of international courts appears 
to be to refer to the logics of European integration. Although compelling 
and literally unchallengeable as an argument intrinsic to the Community 
legal order, its argumentative force is much weaker outside the Commu-
nity law context. Although binding on the Member States, Article 292 EC 
is assuredly not binding on other international courts and tribunals. 
In line with conceptualising Community law as a new legal order of 
international law, we may also read a narrative of progress in Commission 
v Ireland. Inter-state arbitration has come on us as the oldest of the legal 
methods of dispute settlement, conventionally traced back to the 1794 
Jay Treaty.59 In its more modern form, the constitutive instruments of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, namely the 1899 Hague Convention for 
the Pacifi c Settlement of Disputes revised by the 1907 Convention of the 
same denomination, date from the turn of the last century. The origins of 
inter-state arbitration are thus to be found in an era of largely unabated 
state sovereignty which fi nds refl ection in arbitration as a fairly fl exible 
means of dispute settlement, leaving many choices to be made by the 
57  See Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (Oxford, OUP 2001) 54 
and Bernhard Hofstötter, Non-Compliance of National Courts - Remedies in European Com-
munity Law and Beyond (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2005) 165.
58  Cesare P.R. Romano, Case note on Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (2007) 101 
AJIL 171, 175.
59  John Merrills, ‘The Means of Dispute Settlement’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), International 
Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 533, 542.
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states parties. This, in turn, might be perceived as fi tting uneasily with ‘a 
new legal order of international law’, which has stripped the core of state 
sovereignty to its minimum. And yet, from the viewpoint of the Member 
States there are clear advantages associated with arbitration: one may 
mention speed which, in light of the average duration of proceedings be-
fore the ECJ of roughly two years,60 may see Member States turn else-
where. Another issue is confi dentiality which may lead Member States to 
possibly secretive arbitration. Most importantly, the possibility of freely 
appointing the arbitrators will secure the appeal of arbitration for Mem-
ber States. Member States may also view the institutional shortcomings 
of arbitration as appealing which, by contrast to the by now smoothly 
operating Article 228 EC-arrangement,61 have no enforcement mecha-
nism in place. On the other hand, this must not really be a concern for 
the ECJ, since once Member States fail to honour their obligations under 
the Treaty by not respecting an arbitral award, infringement proceedings 
are obviously an option. 
Coming back to the responses to the problem of multiple jurisdic-
tions by both the ECJ and the arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS, we may 
discern two different approaches, irreconcilable with one another. In Com-
mission v Ireland, the ECJ opts for an expansive interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction predicated on preserving the autonomy of the Community le-
gal order. By contrast, the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal under UNC-
LOS is characterised by diplomatic self-restraint. In addition, the arbitral 
tribunal proves to be mindful of the jurisdictional implications of the legal 
environment in which it is operating. Arguably, the approach deployed 
by the arbitral tribunal fi ts better with the characteristics of an interna-
tional legal order which cannot rely on a hierarchically organised judicial 
system. By the same token, the internal perspective adopted by the ECJ 
is well-suited to preserve the autonomy of the Community legal order. 
At the same time, however, preserving the autonomy of the Community 
legal system as one of the ultimate values of the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
may come at the paradoxical price of triggering the fragmentation of in-
ternational law. The ruling of the ECJ is remarkably silent on this point, 
whereas international lawyers seem to be increasingly disgruntled by the 
60  ECJ, Annual Report for 2006, Proceedings of the Court of Justice, Section A.2. Mention, 
however, has to be made of the fact that the average length of proceedings has decreased 
in recent years. The average duration of proceedings in connection with preliminary rulings 
amounted to 19.8 months in 2006, as compared to 23.5 months in 2004 and 20.4 months 
in 2005. With regard to direct actions, the average duration was 20 months in 2006 (21.3 
months in 2005).
61  As activated for the fi rst time in Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-5047; 
on the subsequent developments in the Court’s case law, see Ian Kilbey, ‘Financial Penalties 
under Article 228(2) EC: Excessive Complexity?’ (2007) 44 CML Rev, 743 and Pal Wennerås, 
‘A New Dawn for Commission Enforcement under Articles 226 and 228 EC’ (2006) 43 CML 
Rev 31.
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disruptive forces of Community law on international law.62 In particular, 
the ECJ’s non-deferential attitude with regard to rulings stemming from 
the WTO dispute settlement system which the Court regularly refers to 
as essentially diplomatic in nature continues to raise some eyebrows.63 
In this context, it is noteworthy that the current debate on the fragmen-
tation of international law has as it root confl icting decisions by interna-
tional courts, a fact which has been lamented by former presidents of the 
ICJ in their annual reports to the UN General Assembly.64 
C. MOX Plant as an easy case
In the end, however, the outcome of the ruling in Commission v Ire-
land seems commendable. This is due to the fact that the dispute set-
tlement system foreseen by UNCLOS entails a great degree of fl exibility 
which is able to accommodate more specifi c procedures agreed by the 
parties to a dispute. First, Article 287(5) UNCLOS provides for arbitra-
tion as the default dispute settlement mechanism. Only when two parties 
to a dispute have not opted for the same procedure, essentially such as 
referring the dispute to the ICJ or ITLOS, will arbitration come into play, 
‘unless the parties otherwise agree’. Second, more explicitly, Article 282 
62  Although the International Law Commission’s Study Group on ‘Fragmentation of Inter-
national Law: Diffi culties Arising from the Diversifi cation and Expansion of International 
Law’ deliberately decided to stand clear of the institutional issues of fragmentation and thus 
deplorably missed the opportunity to further stimulate the debate on jurisdictional confl ict, 
this attitude can be gleaned overall from the ILC’s Analytical Study. So, the Study Group 
is fairly critical of ‘disconnection clauses’, for instance, which are meant to ensure the 
continuing application of Community law rules between the EU Member States parties to a 
multilateral treaty and consequently insulating Community law rules within the framework 
of an international agreement. In the words of the ILC, ‘[w]hat may seem disturbing about 
such clauses is that they are open to only some parties to the original treaty and the content 
of the Community law to which they refer may be both uncertain and subject to change’ 
(ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi culties Arising from the Diversifi cation and 
Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the ILC, para 292). The 
Study Group goes on as follows: ‘Like inter se modifi cation, a disconnection clause makes 
it possible for a limited group of parties to enhance the objectives of the treaty by taking 
measures that correspond to their special circumstances. But just like inter se agreements, 
this practice creates the possibility of undermining the original treaty regime. … From the 
perspective of other treaty parties, the use of disconnection clause might create double 
standards, be politically incorrect or just confusing’ (Report of the Study Group, para 293). 
With a view to the MOX Plant dispute, reserving to the ECJ an exclusive jurisdiction ulti-
mately results in ‘a distinctively European take on UNCLOS’ (Robin Churchill and Joanne 
Scott, ‘The MOX Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 643, 669) with similarly 
disruptive forces as exhibited by disconnection clauses. 
63  See the judgments in Case C-377/02 Van Parys [2005] ECR I-1465, paras 42 et seq., 
and Case T-19/01 Chiquita [2005] ECR II-315, paras 156 et seq. In both cases the Court 
rejects private damage claims relying on antecedent WTO rulings fi nding Community law 
in breach of WTO rules.
64  Cf Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmod-
ern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 LJIL 553.
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UNCLOS allows for the accommodation of other dispute settlement provi-
sions yielding binding decisions which have been agreed upon between 
the parties to a dispute. The wording of Article 282 which, again very 
broadly, refers to general, regional or bilateral agreements or other forms 
of agreements, may thus easily ‘receive’ the exclusivity of the Community 
judicial system qua regional agreement. As far as can be seen, such an 
interpretation is also in line with the other methods of treaty interpreta-
tion commonly agreed in international law.65 Consequently, the Court was 
confronted with an easy case in Commission v Ireland since UNCLOS itself 
provided an avenue to avoid trespassing into the competences of other 
courts or tribunals. Against this background, the Court could satisfy itself 
with giving an easy answer based on an approach intrinsic to the Com-
munity legal order, without having to fully explore the international legal 
implications of the problem of multiplied international jurisdictions. 
 However, not all international treaties concluded by the EC in con-
junction with the EU Member States may be that receptive to the pecu-
liarities of the Community legal system. This would apply particularly to 
treaties providing for their own compulsory dispute settlement systems.66 
Clearly, also in this instance, the initiative to start proceedings would 
lie with the interested state party which would therefore enjoy a degree 
of ‘choice’ whether to have recourse to the dispute settlement system 
provided for in a treaty, or rather to involve the ECJ. In such cases of a 
treaty-based dispute settlement system displaying less fl exibility than Ar-
ticle 282 UNCLOS, the states concerned would be squeezed between two 
competing legal obligations and consequently would have to decide which 
obligation to respect and which one to violate. For this category of case, 
the judgment in Commission v Ireland does not provide a workable solu-
tion, apart from the precepts of respecting the ECJ’s judicial monopoly. 
Arguably, in an era where we are coming ever closer to a compulsory 
paradigm in dispute settlement in international law,67 this category of 
cases will gain in relevance. On the other hand, also Article 32 OSPAR, 
for instance, would allow for suffi cient fl exibility to accommodate a wide 
scope of jurisdictional competence of the ECJ, as it refers to the possi-
65  See Article 31ff of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
66  Interestingly, the compulsory jurisdiction of ad hoc panels or the standing Appellate 
Body to decide on any dispute with regard to the implementation of the WTO agreements 
has received no attention at all in the ECJ’s Opinion 1/94. See Marco Bronckers, ‘The Re-
lationship of the EC Courts with Other International Tribunals: Non-committal, Respectful 
or Submissive?’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 601, 610. On Opinion 1/94 in general, cf Meinrad Hilf, 
‘The ECJ’s Opinion on the WTO - No surprise, but wise?’ (1995) 6 EJIL, 1. 
67  See Cesare P.R. Romano, ‘From the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in Inter-
national Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent’ (2006) NYU Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Paper 20 <http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context
=nyu/plltwp> accessed 11 June 2007. 
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bility of parties agreeing otherwise to settle their disputes (Article 32(2) 
OSPAR). Therefore, one can only speculate about the reasons why the 
Commission did not commence infringement proceedings against Ireland 
for initiating arbitration under the OSPAR convention, since also Article 
32 OSPAR would make for a relatively easy case.
D. Practical Limitations of the ECJ’s approach
Given the continuing appeal of referring cases to arbitration for the 
EU Member States as sketched out above, the issue of the enforcement of 
the Court’s broad judicial monopoly needs to be addressed. Since Member 
States have proved wary of starting infringement proceedings against their 
peers,68 the key role in enforcing the Court’s judicial monopoly lies with 
the Commission. However, even if the Commission decides to actually 
start infringement proceedings, the average length of proceedings before 
the ECJ will often mean that a judgment fi nding a violation of Article 292 
EC comes too late, that is after an award has been rendered by an arbitral 
tribunal. This at least assuming that not all international judicial actors 
will adopt a similarly diplomatic stance predicated on judicial comity as 
the arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS did, but rather opt for a more asser-
tive role along the lines of the OSPAR tribunal’s approach in MOX plant. 
This insight may already provide us with a key to understanding 
the policy rationale behind the Commission’s approach, whereas fi rm 
conclusions would be premature in light of the limited number of cases 
involving Article 292 EC as of yet. It is conceivable that the Commission 
actually eschews bringing up cases of jurisdictional confl ict where it is 
likely that a ruling of the ECJ would come too late, that is, after an award 
has been rendered. The reason is that under these circumstances fi nding 
a violation of Article 292 EC would undermine the authority of the arbi-
tral award, potentially amount to a weakening and an embarrassment of 
the international system of dispute settlement as a whole, and put on the 
spot the vexed issue of jurisdictional confl ict. With regard to proceedings 
before the OSPAR arbitral tribunal, the Commission had been informed 
by the Executive Secretary of the commission established under the OS-
PAR convention about the ongoing proceedings.69 Even though the Com-
mission had called on Ireland to suspend OSPAR proceedings, it took 
no further steps after its call had remained unanswered.70 On the other 
hand, the danger of confl icting decisions cannot materialise once an ar-
68  Koen Lenaerts and Dirk van Arts, Procedural Law of the European Union (2nd edn Sweet 
& Maxwell, London 2005) 5-029.
69  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 49.
70  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 50. Instead of suspending 
proceedings, Ireland instituted a second set of proceedings under UNCLOS.
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bitral tribunal has decided to stay proceedings, with the ECJ then being 
able to settle the jurisdictional issue fi rst, without risking contradictory 
decisions which, although they may be smoothed out internally by refer-
ence to the doctrine of supremacy, cannot be squarely resolved on the in-
ternational plane. So, with regard to the arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS 
in MOX plant there was no imminent danger that an arbitral award could 
predate the Court’s judgment, since proceedings had already been stayed 
by means of order No 3 of 24 June 2003. This reading of the Commission’s 
approach is confi rmed by its action in the Iron Rhine71 case, although only 
on a superfi cial reading. Iron Rhine, a dispute between Belgium and the 
Netherlands about the reactivation of an old railway line involving certain 
aspects of EC environmental law, saw close consultations between the 
parties to the dispute and the Commission in order to adequately delimit 
the subject matter of the dispute in light of Article 292 EC.72 In spite of 
the parties being at pains to avoid submitting Community law aspects to 
the established arbitral tribunal, in the end the arbitrators went to some 
length to explain why in their view Community law was not applicable.73 
In addition, the tribunal came up with a fairly curious reading of the CIL-
FIT criteria, considering itself in a position analogous to a national court 
potentially under a duty to refer questions for preliminary rulings to the 
ECJ.74 The tribunal thus linked the question of the applicability of Com-
munity law with the entirely different aspect related to how far a national 
court of last instance could be released from its duty to refer. Despite the 
obvious shortcomings in the tribunal’s reasoning from the point of view 
of Community law, the Commission’s decision not to start infringement 
proceedings appears to have been motivated by the maxim of venire con-
tra factum proprium instead of the danger of an ECJ ruling coming too 
late. Having consulted closely with the parties to the proceedings prior to 
an award being rendered, and therefore - at least implicitly - underwrit-
ten their course of action, it would have been unthinkable for the Com-
mission to later start infringement proceedings without going against the 
legitimate expectations of compliance with Community law which it had 
created in the parties. 
71  Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belgium v Netherlands) (Award of 24 May 2005) <http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1155> accessed 11 June 2007. For a detailed account of the 
Community law implications of this case, see Ineke van Bladel, ‘The Iron Rhine Arbitration 
Case: On the Right Legal Track?’ (2005) Hague YBIL, 3. 
72  Ineke van Bladel, ‘The Iron Rhine Arbitration Case: On the right legal track?’ (2005) 
Hague YBIL 3, 20.
73  Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belgium v Netherlands) (Award of 24 May 2005) paras 97-141.
74  Paul James Cardwell and Duncan French, ‘Who Decides? The ECJ’s Judgment on Ju-
risdiction in the MOX Plant Dispute’ (2007) 17 JEL 121, 127; Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘The MOX 
Plant and IJzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Supreme Arbiter?’ (2006) 19 LJIL 223, 
238.
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Thus, against this background it is arguable that the Commission 
is indeed aware of the problem of possibly confl icting rulings by the ECJ 
and other international courts, and keenly avoids such confl icts by being 
most selective in starting infringement proceedings. In this respect, the 
Commission’s approach mirrors the diplomatic approach deployed by the 
arbitral tribunal established under UNCLOS in being mindful of avoid-
ing actual confl icts between jurisdictions. Without doubt, this position 
is open to abuse, since Member States will only need to appoint speedy 
arbitrators to effectively escape from the Court’s judicial monopoly.
V. Conclusions 
It is remarkable that the issues underlying Article 292 EC have 
cropped up almost simultaneously in two recent cases revolving around 
the permissibility of inter-state arbitration involving EU Members States, 
despite the implications of Article 292 EC. This confi rms the actual rel-
evance of the phenomenon of a multiplication of judicial actors and the 
ensuing judicialisation of international law, which does not stop short of 
reaching out to regional integration organisations. In the absence of a hi-
erarchy between all the judicial actors in place and in light of recent juris-
dictional confl icts, illustrated here by the relationship between the ECJ 
and arbitral tribunals, the question arises whether this multiplication of 
courts and tribunals in international law may contribute in the end to a 
proliferation of disputes, which clearly would run counter to the rationale 
of any system of dispute settlement, namely to contain and defi nitively 
settle legal disputes in the interest of legal peace and legal certainty. In 
other words, the question is which devices exist to solve confl icts between 
jurisdictions.
First of all, it needs to be stressed that any appeal to hierarchy de 
lege ferenda between international judicial actors must remain hypothet-
ical, if not purely fi ctitious. It is more of a thought experiment to deliber-
ate on introducing a preliminary references procedure of sorts, with the 
ICJ being the addressee of questions for preliminary ruling put by other 
international courts and tribunals.75 Although seemingly appealing from 
the point of view of the unity and coherence of a matured international 
legal system, it is far from clear what could actually be gained by upgrad-
75  Nevertheless, such kind of mechanism, although cautiously worded, has been venti-
lated by Judge Schwebel, former president of the ICJ: ‘in order to minimize such pos-
sibility as may occur of signifi cant confl icting interpretations of international law, there 
might be virtue in enabling other international tribunals to request advisory opinions of 
the International Court of Justice on issues of international law that arise in cases before 
those tribunals that are of importance to the unity of international law’, quoted from Martti 
Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ 
(2002) 15 LJIL 553, 554.
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ing the ICJ to such an international super-court. As an idea that has no 
real backing in reality, it must be discarded as a legal glass bead game. 
Second, a promise for resolution may be associated with the con-
cept of a ‘global community of courts’, as most vociferously advocated 
by Slaughter: ‘This community of courts is constituted above all by the 
self-awareness of the national and international judges who play a part. 
They are coming together in all sorts of ways. Literally, they meet much 
more frequently in a variety of settings, from seminars to training ses-
sions and judicial organizations. Figuratively, they read and cite each 
other’s opinions, which are now available in these various meetings, on 
the Internet, through clerks, and through the medium of international 
tribunals that draw on domestic case law and then cross-fertilize to other 
national courts.’76 While the reality of international and national courts 
more frequently taking into account the work of their peers can hardly 
be disputed,77 observing such a community in statu nascendi is more de-
scriptive than prescriptive. As a primarily sociological notion, its concrete 
legal impact appears unclear. Apart from that - as Slaughter explains - a 
community of courts does not necessarily entail more deference to the 
decisions of other courts, but may even breed more vigorous confl ict.78 
Hence, the actual relevance of this concept for the resolution of confl icts 
of jurisdictions remains uncertain and blurred.
Third, the seminal principles of res judicata and lis pendens may 
contain the potential for resolution. However, at least understood as for-
mal concepts, they will often be inapplicable and thus incapable of actu-
ally resolving disputes. Both principles presuppose the ‘same dispute’, 
including the identity of the parties and subject matter. Coming back to 
the example of the potential confl ict between the ECJ and the arbitral 
tribunal under UNLOS, it is far from clear that both judicial actors were 
concerned with the same dispute. The dispute before the ECJ involved 
the Commission and Ireland as parties, whereas before the arbitral tri-
bunal the parties were Ireland and the UK. Moreover, the case before the 
ECJ was restricted to certain aspects of EC law, and was consequently 
only concerned with a fraction of the whole dispute at stake.79 One may 
also consider that a judgment rendered by the ECJ in the framework of 
76  Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harv ILJ 191, 192.
77  Taking an example from current international practice, one may refer to the ICJ heavily 
relying on the work of the ICTY in the Bosnian Genocide case (Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) 2007 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/fi les/91/13685.pdf> 
accessed 11 June 2007). For further examples, see Carl Baudenbacher, ‘Judicial Globaliza-
tion: New Developments or Old Wine in New Bottles?’ (2003) 38 Tex ILJ 505. 
78  Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harv ILJ 191, 193.
79  Cf Cesare P.R. Romano, Case note on Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (2007) 101 
AJIL 171, 178.
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infringement proceedings is purely declaratory of a violation of EC law,80 
whereas the decision of an arbitral tribunal may have farther-reaching 
legal effects.81 
Finally, one may refer to judicial comity as an avoidance technique 
for jurisdictional confl icts. Again, although fi rmly established in tradi-
tional international law, there is no prescriptive value to be gained from 
it, since courtoisie contains an appeal to a moral instead of a legal au-
thority signal. Consequently, violating a concept of judicial comity may 
be perfectly legal as long as it has not been elevated to a norm of general 
international law. At the same time, the concept is not without merits for 
the present purposes, especially when combined with the principles of 
res judicata and lis pendens. More precisely, although at times formally 
inapplicable, res judicata and lis pendens may serve as yardsticks in as-
sessing when judicial comity should be exercised. If two or more interna-
tional courts are confronted with essentially the same dispute, judicial 
comity should be exercised. Certainly, it is not entirely clear how courts 
exercising judicial comity should proceed, and the concept of judicial 
comity is in need of further clarifi cation. What is clear, however, is that 
judicial comity cannot work as a one-way street where one particular 
court regularly relies on comity to secure its maximum reach. Over and 
above that, a starting point may be gleaned from the words of Rosalyn 
Higgins who suggests as follows:
We judges are going to have to learn how to live in this new, complex 
world, and to regard it as an opportunity rather than a problem:
• We must read each other’s judgments.
• We must have respect for each other’s judicial work.
• We must try to preserve unity among us unless context really pre-
vents this.82
This is as good as it gets in an international legal order characterised 
by in-built overlaps of judicial voices which should, however, aim at har-
mony instead of cacophony. 
80  Koen Lenaerts and Dirk van Arts, Procedural Law of the European Union (2nd edn Sweet 
& Maxwell, London 2005) 5-063.
81  It is noteworthy in this context that in January 2007 the arbitral tribunal in MOX Plant, 
while suspending the obligation on the parties to regularly report on compliance with the 
provisional measures indicated, decided to remain seized of the dispute in spite of the ECJ’s 
ruling and thus has not declined jurisdiction so far. See MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (Sus-
pension of Periodic Reports by the Parties, Order No 5 of 22 January 2007).
82  Rosalyn Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 
ICLQ 791, 804.
